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Central bank independence (CBI)as an area for international comparison and for study by international political economists has been around for approximately two decades, spurred on by the work of Bade and Parkin (1982) . It probably reached its full fruition with the work of Cukierman and others, centering on work done at the World Bank. There are others too, and we should not ignore them, but since the mid-1990s most of the work done has centered on the Cukierman-type model.
Interest in the CBI intensified after models of monetary policy found the likelihood of an inflationary bias in monetary policy operated by democratic governments. That analysis turned on the potential for monetary surprises being perpetrated by governments seeking electoral advantage. Later analysis found that if such incentives were fully anticipated by the public, inflation rates in democracies are higher than they would be if somehow government could make a credible commitment to price stability. The search began for how to establish monetary institutions that can be viewed as credible commitments. Delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank was one strand of that exploration.
It is also believed that independent central banks would reduce the scope of monetization of government budget deficits and thereby put downward pressures on deficits. (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992) argued, "Economists and practitioners in the area of monetary policy generally believe that the degree of independence of the central bank from other parts of government affects the rates of expansion of money and credit and, through them, important macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and the size of the budget deficit."
Over time, views of CBI have evolved as our own understanding of institutions has. Central bank structures are chosen in a political system that reflects the nature of the polity. Forder (1998) points out, for example, that statutory CBI only matters if the law conditions behavior. Posen (1993) argues that without a political coalition that wishes to have monetary stability, legal independence would not be granted. Banaian and Luksetich (2001) show that countries with more economic freedom (particularly those with greater security of private property rights) tend to choose central bank structures with greater independence.
Endogeneity issues are only one of the many discussions surrounding the measurement of CBI. Political economists have sought measures of these institutional arrangements, and while some researchers have used measures such as the turnover of central bank governors or survey data, legal independence measures continue to dominate the research agenda. These measures tend to focus on relatively large sets of central bank attributes rather than deciding which ones are more important.
In this paper, I first examine what measures are used. My argument is that in the search for a measure that can embrace the many possible dimensions of independence we have lost sight of why wish to measure CBI. Along the way, we have made decisions regarding the scales on which we measure institutional arrangements that are arbitrary and atheoretic. An absence of theory also surrounds the decisions of averaging. Some measures use simple arithmetic averages while others place weights in ways that are difficult to justify by monetary theory.
In the second half of the paper, I appeal to theory in order to justify using a classification scheme that is lexicographic and simplified. Rather than placing central banks on a scale, I suggest placing them in broad categories; if a researcher were to choose to use an index number that was to be meaningful, one have to choose a ranking a priori of which central bank attributes mattered most. It may be that some matter more for inflation control, while others matter more for long-run economic growth (by reducing uncertainty over monetary policy) or for budget deficit control. My point is not to argue for a particular new ranking, though I will offer one. It is that the researcher cannot avoid deciding what counts, and why, by using a one-size-fits-all measure of CBI. Is there a government official on the central bank board (whether or not she or he is a voting member)?
All of these are references in one way or another to central bank autonomy. As Akhtar (1995) notes, there is no reference to the goals of the central bank, no reference to price stability. Bade and Parkin then asserted from this a rank ordering of which structures were more independent than others by adding up how many of the three choices favored the central bank's independence. Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) 1. CB given final authority over issues clearly defined in the law as CB objectives.
2. Government has final authority only over policy issues that have not been clearly defined as CB goals in the case of conflict with CB.
3. In case of conflict, final decision is up to a council whose members are from CB, legislative branch and executive branch.
4. Legislative branch has final authority on policy issues.
5. Executive has final authority on policy issues, but subject to due process and possible protest by CB.
6. Executive branch has unconditional authority over policy.
These get marked as 1, 0.8, 0.6, … 0. The authors then take each of these measures and collect a set of sub-averages, and then average the sub-averages for either a weighted or an unweighted number lying between zero and one that is considered a measure of legal central bank independence.
In Table 1 I have arrayed the various components of the indexes, and shown the weights applied to each. An advantage of the GMT measurements is that the measure is an unweighted summation (though as discussed below, it assumes all values are equivalent in contributing to independence, without complementarities.) When broken down, the CWN measure has a set of weights that are (1988) ES93 -- Eijffinger and Schaling (1993, p.65) Another issue with these broader measures is the need for a broader set of judgments. In addition, some central bank laws are silent on some measures. For example, few of the 34 central bank laws offered Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002) enough information to measure all sixteen instruments. In this case, the measure averages up the values into the four subcategories and then averages the subaverages in the same way as if they had all sixteen measurements of legal independence.
Further, it is quite difficult to imagine how central banks in transition economies could avoid some participation in the government debt markets. There are few countries with financial markets active enough to permit full private purchase of government debt.
In Ukraine, for instance, few banks have the ability to hold any significant portion of the government's debt. The debt "market" is simply the central bank wire, the closed network of computers that connect commercial banks with the National Bank of Ukraine.
The auction of treasury bonds is conducted by the NBU in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance. At some points, the NBU has acted as "buyer of last resort" in the government debt market because there were no bids available at any interest rate.iv Since that debt is dominant as well in the central bank's portfolio (with the exception of the Baltic states with their currency boards), there may be little choice for the central bank legislation than to allow some participation in the debt market.
The Linear Scale and Averaging
The use of linear scales and averaging to create a single number presents two issues in measurement. First, the linear scale introduces the notion that the gap between each type of institutional arrangement within a certain measure, such as term of office, has an equal effect on independence or on inflation fighting.
So for example, the conflict resolution variable in CWN implies that every step along the path from institutional arrangement 1 to institutional arrangement 6 has the same effect, for example, on reducing inflation or on reducing budget deficits. There's no reason to believe that is true. Banaian and Luksetich (2001) show that only those central banks with the most independent of these six structures have had better inflation performance. The results suggest that perhaps the simple measure of central bank autonomy is as useful a measure of CBI as the fuller measure CMN employ. This result confirms what was found in Banaian, Burdekin and Willett (1995) for industrialized economies. The first and third equations replicate the first and fourth columns of their Table 3 . The size and significance of most coefficients are similar, except for the index for internal price liberalization. Like CMN, I see little evidence of significant effects of CBI as measured by their LVAW index (the p-value of 0.14 indicates a 14% probability of no significance.) The measure of central bank autonomy fares little better.
In the third and fourth columns I take advantage of CMN's insight that the effectiveness of CBI may depend on creating a price system more like those in the industrialized economies, as measured by the cumulative liberalization index (CLI).
They use a slope dummy which splits the slope of LVAW at a CLI measure greater than 4. They used a cut-off at 2, but since this is a cumulative index, it will naturally have higher values in later periods. The mean value of CLI for the third sub-period is 3.42 and only five countries had values less than 2. In their example, this brings the significance of the LVAW measure in total (for a country that has liberalized prices) to about 5-6%.
CMN expected that CBI would only obtain anti-inflationary effects if the degree of price liberalization placed the country's price system more in line with those in the West. Thus, they found that "The coefficients of (CBI) at low levels of cumulative liberalization remain insignificant and the coefficient of CLI (which was significant before) becomes insignificant at conventional levels, but its sign remains negative…" (p. 20). My results show just the opposite when one resets the slope shift dummy to occur at CLI greater than four. It now appears that the effects of CBI in reducing inflation are significant only for countries that have liberalized less. For countries that have CLI > 4, the effect of CBI is nil, while the effects of CLI continue to be as strong as in those regressions without the slope shift coefficient.
It might therefore be useful to run a regression with the principal components along as CMN have. One may use the principal components and then re-arrange or "unscramble" the results to obtain coefficients on the original central bank attributes. viii This appears in the next table. I dropped the third principal component (which mostly loads the ability of the CB governor to hold another office) as it was insignificant. The result of that estimation is that the conflict resolution mechanism in the central bank law and the CB's objectives are significantly correlated with a country's price depreciation.
One should approach these results with due caution, however, as they are based on only 20 central banks for whom full data are available. (2006)) Central bank governors may change when governments themselves are unstable. And countries with different attitudes towards inflation (or more precisely, different dominant interest groups with different preferences for inflation) may in fact prefer longer or shorter turns in office. The importance of commercial banks would be one example.
It is somewhat of a stretch then to say that high rates of turnover of a central bank's CEO is evidence for or against independence. Central bank accountability may call for a frequent review of performance, while granting high amounts of independence in the inter-review period. It would be odd to view these reviews then as political interference.
Evidence on turnover by Cukierman (1992) found two-way causality between inflation and turnover. Dreher, Sturm and De Haan (2006) show that CEOs are replaced more often when inflation is higher, along with higher degrees of political instability and turnover and the election of left-wing governments. Again, the problem arises: Is this a measure of independence or accountability? As Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) note, a long term in office may just reflect a subservient central bank governor, while shorter terms could mean a central bank governor who stands up to the executive and/or legislative branches. Cukierman and Webb (1995) try to refine the turnover measure by looking only at those changes in central bank CEOs that happen within six months of a change in government. Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) argue that this measure may be quite useful in developing economies, where weak rule of law may mean the central bank's legal and actual independence differ sharply.
Other attempts to measure autonomy have met with more success. For example, Oatley (1999) finds that when holding labor market structure and policy preferences of the government equal, simple measures of autonomy explain inflation outcomes better than either the GMT or CWN indices. Likewise, Banaian, Burdekin and Willett (1995) find that the absence of a government override of central bank policy outperforms the CWN index. They look at seven attributes, none of which refers to a legal document. The resulting ranking is very subjective and while interesting, the paper has so far not attracted much attention.
5 Back to the Future: A new Lexicography of Central Banks.
Thus it appears from this analysis that the two or three most important factors in determining which central bank de jure features help reduce inflation are the CB's focus on price stability and whether or not it has final authority in setting monetary policy. My strategy is to use that feature to return to a model such as Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) .
However, to do so requires a few adjustments to their process.
First, as central banks have focused on inflation targeting, many elements of political autonomy for central banks have ceased to have much variation between them. (2006a) 2. "Curtail direct lending to governments." Consensus has formed among central bankers that any lending to government should be temporary, restricted by amount and subject to market rates of interest.
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3. "Ensure full autonomy for setting the policy rate." This implies both instrument independence (in the sense of Debelle and Fisher (1995) ) and a consensus that a short-term interest rate is the best operational target for monetary policy. where price stability is mentioned with other goals, even those that would "potentially conflict" with price stability. This is quite outside the consensus view they claim. xi In the case of many laws governing central banks in the EU, laws are worded to state that price stability is the primary objective of monetary policy and task of the central bank, and then say "without prejudice to its primary objective", the central bank can support macroeconomic policies of the government. In this case, I believe the subsidiary of full employment or other objectives is sufficiently clear to fit the consensus, and I treat those central banks as if they had a sole objective.
A very important consideration in this would be whether objectives for financial stability in a central bank charter conflict with price stability, when those are the only two objectives listed in the law. In the ECB law makes it quite clear that financial stability is secondary to price stability, but in central bank laws of countries where central banks are said to have a great deal of autonomysuch as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of Canada, or the Riksbankfinancial stability is provided more as a constraint on pursuit of price stability. xii It is quite true, as Ferguson (2002) presidents will hold a great deal of sway and make it difficult for the central bank to hold onto the conflicting policy. There are arguments for the central bank having more autonomy; the more transparent is the veto of the legislature or executive. I will nonetheless argue for a very clear autonomy, and thus the only veto that will be seen as still permitting a strong central bank hand in conflicts will be provisions that only allow for veto over matters not defined as the bank's primary objectivethat is, if the central bank has a sole objective of price stability but wanted to build new, ornate branch offices, the government could object to that. Just not the bank's pursuit of price stability. xiii
In Table 4 I In developing countries, a broad majority follow this advice. Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) found in a survey of 94 central banks that 26% had only monetary stability as a goal, while another 57% had monetary policy and other goals that did not compete with that goal, such as financial stability or stability of the payments system.
Most of the countries that have retained a government override do so within a framework of inflation targeting. In these cases the government has made the commitment to the inflation targeting regime and assigned the central bank the task of meeting that objective. Many developing and emerging-market economies have also chosen this path. It may be in this case that this method provides some accountability to government of reducing pressures from fiscal deficits. Australia is an interesting case insofar as it retains (in Section 10 of the Reserve Bank Act of 1959) both the goal of providing for "the stability of the currency of Australia" and to "(maintain) full employment in Australia." The consensus view would find this one step below the independence of the other government-adopted inflation targeters in the OECD.
In a strong sense, there is a parallel between these central banks and the pre-ECB Nederlandsche Bank. As Burdekin and Willet (1991) argue, the Dutch government could provide for an override of the bank's policy, but had to do so by an open directive that was laid before the parliament, with an explanation. Likewise, these inflation targeting central banks are under the control of government, but the government has to argue openly why their override is consistent with the agreed inflation target. Governments cannot use the central banks as scapegoats for a failed macroeconomic policy when they have a veto over policy.
It is tempting to place the central banks listed here on a scale, much as Alesina or
Eijffinger and Schaling did using a similar strategy fifteen years or more ago. But, the nature of the differences in the scale would now be very different. The difference between the two most independent structures that we actually observe is over the possibility that the Federal Reserve and the Swiss National Bank are less inflation-averse because of their dual mandates. But Meyer (2001) points out that the sole goal of the ECB may not mean a zero weight on output variability from full employment.xvi I do not think we have yet enough data on the ECB to determine whether it has a weight on output variability greater than zero. Likewise, it is worth considering whether the step between Japan and Australia is the same as between Australia and the other inflation targeters (outside of the ECB or Mexico.) It is, however, quite reasonable to treat the Fed, SNB, the ECB and the Bank of Mexico as qualitatively more independent than those where the government has an override (even when providing accountability through an inflation targeting program.) As argued earlier in this paper, ordinal rankings make some sense but cardinal values do not.
Conclusions
It is more contentious to use the classification scheme described here, but it has precedent. The IMF (2006) If one wanted to move from a de jure measure of central bank independence to a de facto measure, this would seem the path to take. The exchange rate classification uses theorized outcomes of exchange rate behavior to make the classification. Is the central bank's structure or its legal mandate the only determinants of, say, price level variability?
If one wanted to include fiscal dominance, should budget deficit or government debt ratios (to GDP) be included as a criterion for grouping?
Instead, I have argued for a return to a simpler measure of central bank independence that uses the coalescing of professional opinion in research since the development of these measures fifteen years ago. By focusing on the price stability mandate, instrument independence and the conflict resolution mechanism, I find that a group of banks led by the ECB have moved ahead of the Federal Reserve and Swiss National Bank. Using those criteria keeps the Fed and SNB ahead of the countries whose governments have imposed an inflation target on their central banks.
Most importantly, I argue that central bank independence needs to be thought of as a set of categories, not a continuous variable. While the latter is tempting for the purposes of statistical analysis, the process of creating continuous variables leads to problems in interpretation, and these problems are not solved by computing better. The method used instead is quite arbitrary, in particular the ordering of which criterion goes first. I believe it is better to make the choice and do so explicitly than to provide any sense of evenhandedness or numerical certainty through an aggregation scheme. Schaling (1995) notes, this is not a direct criterion applied but implied in the discussion of the "divorzio" of the Banca d'Italia from absorbing the excess supply of Treasury securities. See also Tabellini (1988) .
ii Buiter (2006) refers to complete operational independence as equivalent to a lack of substantive accountability. There is no judgment or consequence for a central bank that, acting as a delegate of authority from the people and/or the government, suffers when its actions are not desired by those principals.
It is not surprising that truly operationally independent central banks have effectively no substantive accountability at all. Independence has to mean that those in charge of monetary policy cannot be fired except for incapacity or serious misconduct, and that financial remuneration and working conditions likewise cannot be used to reward or punish them. (pp. 23-24) iii I say this despite the fact that Alesina goes so far as to classify the Bank of Italy with a fractional number. That is clearly a judgment meant to indicate that he thought there was some difference between BI and other dependent central banks, but not enough to fit into the classifications warranting the next integer. The intent is nonetheless ordinal. iv That is not to deny that at other times the NBU has bought debt or refused bids because the government would not accept the interest rate that the debt market would bear at that time. v That does not preclude, of course, the use of categorical or dummy variables in regression so that one can obtan conditional differences in means. vi There are eight countries for which there are two subperiods after reform of the central bank law, so these means are for a set of 34 time periods of varying length. See CMN, Table A4 ; the means I offer skip the first subperiod in every case. vii Mongolia is excluded because CMN have no inflation data, and Poland after the second central bank law is excluded because there is no information on price liberalization. viii One might wish to argue that the price liberalization measures should be included in the principal components analysis. It turns out that those data are mostly orthogonal to the central bank attributes, and it makes little difference whether they are included or excluded. ix For the purposes of this paper, the following countries are listed as inflation targeters as of 2004:
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand and the United Kingdom. I would also include the European Central Bank.
x There is also a practical consideration. Using a classification scheme for consensus views with verbs like "set" or "ensure" are straightforward. Either price stability is the sole goal or it is not; either the CB has final authority over monetary policy or it does not. "Curtail" is a different matter. We can curtail without eliminating entirely, so deciding whether one has curtailed is a judgment call. This reintroduces the same arbitrariness that I have faulted in the CWN and GMT indices. xi In terms of the CWN measure, they state price stability is a primary objective if the central bank's score on the CWN table is greater than or equal to 0.4. xii The Bank of England is stranger yet. It is told to pursue price stability and "subject to that", pursue policies to support government goals for economic growth and employment. It also has a memorandum of understanding with the government to provide for stability of the monetary system and the financial system (particularly regarding the payments system), and to provide oversight for the financial system more generally. xiii Again, in terms of the CWN measure, I would count only those central banks with values of 0.8 or 1 as holding the upper hand in conflicts. xiv On the website that complements this book, you can find a longer list of other central banks.
xv The dual mandate of the Swiss National Bank may be less known. Article 5, section 1 states "The National Bank shall pursue a monetary policy serving the interests of the country as a whole. It shall ensure price stability. In so doing, it shall take due account of the development of the economy." I am not interpreting the words "In so doing" as providing the same degree of subsidiarity in policy objectives as I have described elsewhere. xvi Another way to think of this is whether a central bank that has the upper hand in policy conflicts with the government and instrument independence is any less "weight conservative" in the Rogoff (1985) or Svensson (1997) sense than a central bank with those qualities and a stated sole goal for price stability. Such banks may nonetheless have the ability and incentive to smooth output or interest rate fluctuations.
